Abstract-This paper describes a technique for implementing k-resilient objects-distributed objects that remain available, and whose operations are guaranteed to progress to completion, despite up to k site failures. The implementation is derived from the object specification automatically, and does not require any information beyond what would be required for a nonresilient nondistributed implementation. It is therefore unnecessary for an applications programmer to have knowledge of the complex protocols nonnally employed to implement fault-tolerant objects. Our technique is used in ISIS, a system being developed at Cornell to support resilient objects.
I. INTRODUCTION
A BSTRACT data types [141 have been proposed as a methodology for structuring both centralized and distributed software systems. An instance of an abstract data type, called an object, encapsulates some data, the object-data, and provides its users with a set of operations to manipulate these data. In object-based distributed systems, an operation is performed by invoking an object using a remote procedure call [20] , which passes value parameters to the object and returns the results of the operation to the caller. An operation may call another object; this gives rise to nested operations and nested remote procedure calls. The best guarantee that present distributed systems offer in the presence ofsite failures is that operations execute atomically: that they execute either completely or not at all, and if concurrent access to the object is permitted, that operations execute in a serializable manner. If a site at which an operation is being executed fails, the operation is either aborted or blocks until the site recovers. A nested transaction scheme [18] , [19] is used to implement this behavior. In this paper, we describe a technique to implement objects in such a way that their operations progress to completion even if up to a specified number of sites fail.
Checkpoints have been used in many systems to facilitate recovery from failures [23] . Here we show how checkpoints can be used to obtain a k-resilient implementation ofan object: one in which operations are guaranteed to progress to completion despite up to k site failures. We assume that processors satisfy a fail-stop assumption: that they fail by halting and do not produce spurious messages, and that active sites are notified of the failure of a site [211 .l The method we present does not 'Byzantine or other malicious failures are not considered. An underlying failure detector can be implemented in software to obtain the abstraction of fail-stop processors.
require the object specification to contain any information beyond what is required for a nonresilient implementation. Thus a specification may be given in a language similar to MODULA [261, Ada [12] , or ARGUS [161. A k-resilient implementation is derived from the specification automatically. The advantage of this approach is that a user wishing to develop a fault-tolerant system can do so easily, without having to program or even understand complex protocols for synchronization between sites. This technique has been implemented in ISIS, a project at Cornell that aims to design and develop a system that provides support for the construction of resilient objects [9] . * Availability: Even after up to k sites fail, it must be possible to access (a copy of) the object-data. * Forward progress: After up to k site failures, there must be enough information at the remaining active sites to continue the execution of any operation that was in progress.
To satisfy these constraints, a k-resilient object must be implemented at k + 1 or more sites, because after k sites fail, there must be at least one the object-data is available, and which is able to continue execution.
A. Availability
The availability constraint is satisfied by replicating the object-data at all the sites at which an object resides. This gives rise to two problems. First, the different copies of replicated data must be kept consistent. Second, because operations on an object can be invoked concurrently from more than one site, it is necessary to synchronize invocations. These issues also arise in systems that run nested transactions on replicated databases, and are addressed by using a replicated data concurrency control algorithm to synchronize access to data. Several such algorithms have been proposed in the literature and Bernstein and Goodman have presented a theory for proving that they operate correctly in the presence of site failures [6] . In most situations ISIS uses a variant of the "available copies" algorithm proved correct in [6] .
B. Forward Progress
The forward progress constraint is met using a coordinatorcohort scheme, in conjunction with checkpoints and retained results (Section II-C). When an operation a.
{al,a25-* ,an} is invoked on an object, one of the sites at which the object resides is designated as the coordinator for 0, and it executes the operation. While executing 0, the coordinator penodically takes checkpoints at the other sites, called its cohorts. It does so by transmitting enough information to its cohorts to ensure that 0 could be completed by any one of them, if the coordinator fails at some point in the activity. If such a failure occurs, one of the cohorts takes over the role of coordinator, and continues the execution. At the end of the activity, the coordinator notifiles its cohorts of the changes to the object-data, and the cohorts make the necessary updates to their copies. This scheme achieves k-resiliency because there are at least k cohorts-each time the coordinator fails, it is replaced by one of the remaining cohorts. If an action ai is a call to another object, we assume that the same scheme is used in the called object to ensure that it is completed despite up to k' failures, where k' is the resiliency of the called object. We must have k' > k for the calling object to be k-resilient.
Since all the sites at which an object resides are equally capable of performing operations, any site could assume the role of coordinator. The most practical way to choose a coordinator, and the approach adopted in ISIS, is for the site at which a request to perform an operation originates to appoint itself as the coordinator, with the other sites serving as its cohorts. If the object on which the operation is to be performed does not exist at the site where the request originates, the coordinator is chosen based on an ordering of the sites. In ISIS, this ordering is static, and is determined from preassigned site-numbers. An alternative is to run a consensus protocol among the sites, perhaps choosing the coordinator based on the current load on the system. This, however, involves additional communication. A consensus protocol can also be run among the the cohorts to choose a new coordinator when a failure occurs, but a simpler method-and the one used in ISIS-is to base this choice on the same ordering that is used to select the initial coordinator.
C. Checkpoints and Retained Results
The information required for achieving forward progress is contained in checkpoints and retained results. The coordinator can establish a checkpoint before any action ai by informing its cohorts of its local state. Action ai is then the location of that checkpoint, which is said to cover actions a I through as l .
The data included in a checkpoint are the value of the instruction pointer, the values of the object-data, and the values of the temporary variables; we will later show how the information transmitted at a checkpoint can be reduced considerably. Ifthe coordinator fails, a cohort enters the state the coordinator had at the most recent checkpoint location and executes forward.
A problem arises if the failed corrdinator could have performed external actions since the latest checkpoint. Consider Fig. 2 . The coordinator establishes a checkpoint at the start of 0= {al, a2, ---, an}, one before a3, and fails after executing a4. The new coordinator uses the information in the latest checkpoint to set the values of the object-data and the temporary data to those they had before the failed coordinator executed a3. It Each activity is hence given a unique identifier, its activity-ID. The activity-ID for a top level activity is generated by its coordinator, which makes it known to its cohorts before it executes the first action. Each action of an activity is then identified uniquely by its action-ID, which is formed from the activity-ID and the index of the action. When a coordinator performs an external action, it passes its action-ID to the called object. This action-ID then becomes the activity-ID at the next level, and so on. At the end of an activity, but before the results are returned to the caller, the coordinator for that activity transmits a copy of the results to its cohorts. The coordinator and the cohorts store a copy of these results in association with the activity-ID. Consider Fig. 3 , which depicts the progress of a coordinator in an object Y. Even though the coordinator establishes a checkpoint before every action, the checkpoint information is not sufficient for the cohotts to determine whether a2 was executed or not, since they cannot distinguish between the two cases (a) and (b) of coordinator failure. The new coordinator starts by issuing a2. If a2 is an external action on X, and if X does not retain its results, a2 would be executed twice in case (b), possibly leaving X inconsistent. This problem arises because in any distributed system, it is impossible to both take an action at a site and inform other sites about it atomically, unless multiphase protocols are carried out for every action.
On the other hand, X need not retain the results of an operation that is covered by a checkpoint in the invoking activity, because it will never be reissued by a cohort. One alternative is for the coordinator of an activity to instruct all previously called objects to discard their retained results each time it establishes a new checkpoint. This leads to a large number of messages being sent, and is justifiable only if storage cost is extremely high.
The method adopted in ISIS is the following. [8] . This "lazy propagation" of information is based on the fact that information about ,a read lock is not significant until the activity holding the lock attempts to modify other data items, or some other activity attempts to update the locked data item. The scheme guarantees that read lock information is delivered to a site before any action that requires this information is taken. When a cohort takes over a coordinator, it first "reregisters" the read locks held by the failed coordinator before it resumes execution. In [7] , we describe a number of ways in which a concurrency control algorithm can be optimized, and plan to support these optimizations as options in ISIS.
III. IMPROVING PERFORMANCE
The implementation of resilient objects, as we have described it, would seem to suffer from a heavy communication overhead. There are, however, a number of ways in which this can be reduced. In [8] , we describe a method of "concurrent propagation" of information, which reduces much of the latency that usually results from updating replicated data. In the rest of this section, we describe methods that improve performance by reducing the number of messages transmitted, or by decreasing the amount of information carried in these messages.
To reduce the message traffic induced by establishing checkpoints, while still preserving the advantages of frequent checkpointing, a hierarchical method of establishing checkpoints can be followed. Checkpoints other than the initial one need not be established at all the cohorts: the coordinator can instead establish checkpoints frequently at one or two cohorts, and 3At the moment a new checkpoint is added, both it and the old checkpoint are valid. Hence [24] , for although different versions may exist at different sites, the quorums are so chosen that the result of a read is-always the latest version written. In effect, only the latest version is accessible at any time. When a single-version concurrency control scheme is used, each site has the same view of the object-data. In particular, if the coordinator reads an object-data item and fails without altering it, the new coordinator reads the same value. 4 Assuming this behavior, the coordinator need not transmit the values of all the temporary variables and the object-data at each checkpoint. For example, no object-data values need be transmitted at the initial checkpoint, since the cohorts have the same view of the initial data. The coordinator can carry out all actions on temporary variables and on objectdata locally, and when a new checkpoint is established, it need transmit only those values altered since the last checkpoint. This is easily implemented by having the coordinator maintain a bit vector, with a bit corresponding to each variable. When a variable is updated, the corresponding bit is set. At a checkpoint, only the values of variables whose bits are set are transmitted, and the bit vector is reset. Certain concurrency control methods, however, require that whenever an update is made on a replicated data item, it is made on more than one copy.5 In this case, if an update is made after a checkpoint, the value at the checkpoint will not be available to the cohorts after the update, unless it was stored as part of the checkpoint information. So, each time a cohort is required by the concurrency control algorithm to update its copy of an object data item, it checks whether an old copy exists in the checkpoint information, and includes one if not.
If a concurrency control algorithm used -does not release locks until the commit point (as is true ofthe default algorithm used in ISIS), it is not necessary to do a broadcast to retain the results of a read-only transaction; the values could be read again if a site fails. Finally, some of the broadcasts that have to be made can be merged together. For example, the distribution of retained results to the cohorts can be combined with the commit pro4This is not true when so-called multiple-version concurrency control mechanisms are used [51. In such settings, the new coordinator might read a different version, corresponding to a different serialization order.
5This is required when a quorum mechanism is used. With two-phase locking, write locks must be obtained at all the sites, but having locked a data item, the coordinator can update it locally. It is necessary to transmit its value to the cohorts only at checkpoints and at the end of the operation. tocal required for concurrency control, during which the final values of the object-data are installed at the cohorts. This is advantageous in systems in which the number of messages, rather than their size, is the determining vactor in communication cost. This is true in ISIS, where each message is processed by a number of software layers before being transmitted on a high bandwidth medium.
IV. EXAMPLE
We now present an example of the use of this technique. For the sake of clarity, we have limited the functionality of the objects described; actual objects would often support a much larger range of functions. Fig. 4 depicts three resilient objects: vendor, bank, and theater. Vendor reserves theater tickets and charges them to a customer's bank account. It supports the operations show_seats, whicbidisplays the seats available for a given performance, charge_seat, which charges the cost of a seat to a customer's bank account, and get_stat to get statistics. Vendor calls bank to transfer money between accounts, and calls theater to reserve the seats.
Bank has the operations transfer, which transfers a sum of money from one account to another, and inquire, which checks whether the balance in an account is large enough to cover a withdrawal.
Theater supports three operations: display, reserve, and cancel. Display displays the seats available for a particular performance. Reserve reserves a seat and returns its cost if the seat is available, and returns the value UNAVAILABLE if not. The operation cancel cancels a reservation. For increased concurrency, display does not lock the data it reads; it is therefore possible for a seat that was displayed as available to be unavailable when a reservation is attempted (a sad comment on real life!). Charge-seat takes this into account.
The specification of vendor was given in Fig. 1 . The objectdata are the variables seats_sold_here and fee. Charge-seat calls reserve in theater to reserve a seat, and transfers its cost from the customer's bank account to the theater's account. It also transfers a fee from the customer's account to the vendor's account. If the balance in the customer's account is insufficient to cover the transfers, the reservation is canceled.
Let us consider the actions taken within the object vendor, when the operation charge-seat is invoked. the seat requested is available and that the customer's bank balance is sufficient to cover its cost. Fig. 5 shows a possible execution. The coordinator begins by establishing a checkpoint, distributing the values of the instruction pointer -and the parameters to its cohorts. It then executes the actions as shown, establishing a checkpoint before the second invocation of the transfer operation. Because only enough, price, and final-price have been updated, only their values are transmitted. At the end of the activity, the coordinator distributes the final value of seats_sold_here and the result to be retained to its cohorts, and then returns the result to its caller. Fig. 6 depicts an execution where the coordinator fails after the second invocation of the transfer operation. A cohort takes over and resumes execution from the checkpoint. It reissues the transfer operation, and receives the retained results from bank. It then proceeds as before.
V. EXTENSION TO TOTAL FAILURE
We have shown how a k-resilient object ensures that its operations are completed if up to k sites fail. If more than k sites fail, we may desire that the execution of an operation block until one or more of the sites recover, and then continue. To achieve this, the cohorts write all checkpoint information and retained results on nonvolatile storage [2] . When a site recovers from a total failure, it runs a protocol to determine whether it was the last site to fail [22] . When 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed a method of obtaining a resilient implementation of an object from a nonresilient specification using checkpoints and retained results. We have also shown how to reduce the communication overhead so that the implementation is efficient enough to be viable. The approach brings the implementation of a distributed fault-tolerant system within the realm of a relatively unsophisticated programmer, freeing him or her from the burden of implementing complicated synchronization mechanisms. It is being implemented in ISIS, a system that supports resilient objects. We expect systems like ISIS that provide very "high-level" services to become indispensable as distributed processing becomes the most prevalent mode of computing.
